The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, Monday, January 13 2014
Indonesians have been uniformly scratching their heads. The closer the end of this government, it seems, the greater the disarray. One inept debacle after another.
From the up-down hike of LPG canisters, to Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Moeldoko’s pitch for the President to be awarded honorary five-star general status —adorned only to Soeharto and former Armed Forces commander Gen. AH Nasution — confusion is the only constant of this government in 2014.
The palace has been coy, maintaining that these were unilateral actions unbeknown to the President and senior Cabinet members. Yet it’s hard to grasp how decisions of such economic consequence and historical magnitude were made without sufficient consultation.
If what the President’s administration has said is true, then it is conceding that this government is as haphazard and leaderless as critics have charged.
Jakarta’s inconsistent reaction to Australia turning back asylum seeker boats to Indonesian waters last week is another episode of confusion and disgrace that many had to brook.
Yudhoyono gained plaudits for his resoluteness against Canberra in the wake of the spying revelations in November — sternness in national pride to satisfy personal ego.
Then in the wake of reports that Australia was pushing back boats into Indonesian waters last week, Moeldoko revealed he had been consulted by Australian Defence Force chief Gen. David Hurley a fortnight earlier, who informed him that Australia would send back boats from Indonesia that had Indonesian crew on board.
“I understood such tactical moves,” Moeldoko said. Such assent angered and perplexed many, not least senior diplomats who have stood on the frontline of the row.
This stance came as a sharp contrast to the Moeldoko of November 2013, who cancelled joint exercises with the Australian military, including joint patrols, in the wake of the spying row.
On the face of it, Moeldoko seemed to be defying the government’s position of rejecting Australia’s policy. Yet, such open defiance contradicts his style and character.
Given the significance of the election year, Yudhoyono wouldn’t have nominated a trusted officer as military chief.
Known more for his intellect than his battlefield prowess — much like Yudhoyono — Moeldoko had been Army chief just three months before being promoted to TNI chief in August.
His appointment raised eyebrows as, according to the established rotation, an Air Force general was next in line for the post after it was previously held by a Navy admiral. Only two Navy officers and one from the Air Force have ever been TNI chief.
A figure close to the president’s brother-in-law, Moeldoko served as deputy and successor to Gen. (ret.) Pramono Edhie Wibowo twice, as commander of the Siliwangi Division in West Java and as Army chief.
So it’s more likely Moeldoko was following orders than being impudent.
Is something afoot between Jakarta and Canberra that we, even the Foreign Ministry, are unaware of?
If so, hush-hush policy rarely succeeds under this government.
Moeldoko said his statement “did not indicate that I agreed [with the policy]” and wasn’t related to foreign policy.
In the language of diplomacy, however, Moeldoko’s discussion with the Australian defense chief was an unwitting consent to the Australian initiative.
It is an undisputable fact of international law that Australia cannot send boats into Indonesian waters without permission.
By saying he “understood” Australia’s action, Moeldoko fell into the trap of the “doctrine of acquiescence” first employed under Operation Relex by the Howard government.
Diplomatic notes of notification would be sent to Jakarta just before a turn-back. A non-response, or a delayed one, was regarded by Canberra as consent.
As Howard’s former foreign minister, Alexander Downer, recently explained in The Advertiser, the boats would be “towed to the edge of Indonesia’s territorial waters under Operation Relex, 19 kilometers from the Indonesian coast”.
Hence, we can understand why Prime Minister Tony Abbott remained gleeful about the bilateral cooperation on boatpeople as “evidenced by the discussion that seemed to have taken place between Gen. Moeldoko and our own Gen. Hurley not long ago”.
There are also questions of legality binding Australia, which Moeldoko’s statement of “understanding” may have unintentionally waived.
The question is where Australia is intercepting these boats.
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Australia can only stop boats within its territorial and contiguous zones (24 nautical miles from the Australian shore). It cannot board vessels outside this area without permission.
International obligations also forbid unseaworthy vessels to be cast to their fate.
So if these boats are being intercepted outside of Australian waters, how can Australian patrols then board them, determine their seaworthiness, and decide the refugee status of passengers?
Furthermore, as a signatory to UN conventions on refugees, Australia must adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, which entails avoiding sending people to countries that do not acknowledge legal refugee status, such as Indonesia.
Canberra has, unsurprisingly, again looked to its Big Brother, the United States, as an example in its turning away of boats from Cuba. But Washington is not a signatory of many maritime international norms that Canberra has ceded to.
As the diplomatic wrangle trudges along and the legal interpretations vary, Indonesia needs to settle its own tangled self with less nescience if it really wants to be taken seriously by Australia.
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ma 13 jan 2014 - 20:50